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I. INTRODUCTION
O n June 11, 1996, British Airways' (BA) Chief Executive Rob-
Jert Ayling and American Airlines' (AA) President Donald
Carty' stood side-by-side against the backdrop of London's Wal-
dorf Hotel with British and American flags draped over their
shoulders. 2 As the media gathered, they unveiled the most sig-
nificant airline alliance to date and boldly predicted prompt
regulatory approval.3 Smiling coolly amidst the swarming on-
lookers of the West End theatre district, the two executives
seemed unsuspecting of the long ordeal to follow, that the fate
of their alliance would rest not just with the regulators in Wash-
ington and London, but with those in Brussels as well. They
could not have anticipated that more than two years later, with
billions of dollars of potential revenue lost,4 the alliance would
remain grounded.
On July 30, 1998, twenty-five months5 after learning of the
proposed alliance between British Airways and American Air-
' On May 20, 1998, Mr. Carty replaced Robert Crandall as chairman and CEO
of American Airlines. See Charles Goldsmith, BA and American Mark Second Year of
Grounded Linkup, WALiL ST. J. EUR., June 11, 1998, at 1.
2 See Goldsmith, supra note 1.
3 See id.
4 American Airlines predicted that the deal could generate as much as US $4
billion a year in new revenues. See id.
5 A writer with the Wall StreetJournal Europe referred to the period of inaciv-
ity caused by the two-year review as "one of the longest and costliest airline delays
in history." Id. The agreement between BA and AA was concluded on June 11,
1996, and notified to the European Commission (Commission) shortly thereaf-
ter. The Commission decided to initiate proceedings on July 3, 1996, and issued
a notice inviting interested parties to comment on October 2, 1996. See Commis-
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lines, the European Commission6 finally published a notice indi-
cating conditions under which it would be willing to approve the
partnership.7 Although negotiations are still continuing, the no-
tice signaled a potential conclusion to one of the most intrigu-
ing cases in recent years, from both an antitrust and a
constitutional law perspective. The Commission's review of the
BA-AA alliance set the stage for a battle of competences,8 the
outcome of which will shape the future of competition in trans-
atlantic air transport9 and of diplomatic relations 0 in the area.
sion Notice Concerning the Alliance Agreement Between British Airways and
American Airlines, 1996 O.J. (C 289) 4. On December 6,1996, the United King-
dom Office of Fair Trading announced that the alliance would be required to
give up 168 weekly take-off and landing slots at Heathrow Airport to receive ap-
proval. See Michael Skapinker & Samer Iskandar, BA and AA Iope a Compromise
Will Let Alliance Take Wing, FIN. TIMES, June 11, 1998, at 8. On July 27, 1997, the
Commission declared that the alliance would need to give up in the neighbor-
hood of 350 take-off and landing slots. See id. The past year has involved numer-
ous rumours of hostility amidst public declarations of amicable dealings and
cooperation between the Commission and the Office of Fair Trading.
6 The European Commission is the main executive body of the European
Community (EC). The Council of Ministers (Council) consists of representatives
from the Member States and is the Community's main legislative body. For those
readers wishing for a more general background on the Community and its insti-
tutions, there is an abundance of books on the subject. See, e.g., DERRICK WYATT
& ALAN DASHWOOD, WYATT AND DASHWOOD'S EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw (3d ed.
1993).
7 See Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance Between British Airways and
American Airlines, 1998 OJ. (C 239) 10. This notice expresses the "preliminary
opinion of the Commission... that the Agreement in its entirety infringes Arti-
cle 85 and, as far as the hub-to-hub routes are concerned, Article 86 if imple-
mented without the measures envisaged by the Commission." Id. The
Commission's decision, pending the parties' acceptance of the conditions and
any further negotiations between the parties and the Commission, is still forth-
coming. Many newspapers and journals published general aspects of the Com-
mission's proposed conditions as soon as they were publicly announced on July 8,
1998, by the Commission's press services. See, e.g., Laurence Zuckerman, Europe-
ans Act to Clear Way for Air Pacts, Conditionally, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1998, at D1; Don
Phillips, EU Sets Terms for Airline Deal, WASI-. POST, July 9, 1998, at A9; EC Details
American-BA, United-Lufihansa-SAS Conditions, AVIATION DAILY, July 9, 1998, at 53.
8 See infra Part II.C.3.
9 The commercial aviation sector is quickly consolidating, with four very large
alliances emerging from the pack:
(1) British Airways-American Airlines (with members Cathay Pacific, Canadian,
Qantas, and Iberia, this alliance will be known as "Oneworld.");
(2) The Star Alliance (Lufthansa, United, Scandanavian Airline System (SAS),
Air Canada, Thai Airlines, and Varig);
(3) Delta, Swissair, Sabena, and Austrian; and
(4) KLM, Northwest.
See Michael Skapinker, Boarding Business Class Now, FIN. TIMES,July 9, 1998, at 13.
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Despite having based its review of the BA-AA alliance on a
virtually obsolete treaty provision,"1 the Commission refused to
acknowledge its relative legal impotence, remaining resolute
amidst challenges to its competence from two of the world's pre-
mier commercial airlines1 2 and two of the most established anti-
10 As investigations of alliances involving third country routes such as BA-AA
and the Star Alliance involve concurrent reviews by the Commission and the
Member States involved, relations between the Commission and Member States
are likely to be strained. In addition, the relations between the Community and
the United States are also at stake. Transatlantic alliances being reviewed by the
Commission and the Member States concerned are in most cases being reviewed
concurrently by the United States Department of Transportation, whose philoso-
phy on how best to ensure effective competition has frequently differed with that
of the Commission. See, e.g., Michael Skapinker, US Defends Alliances' Rights to Air
Routes, FIN. TIMES, May 4, 1998, at 1. Charles Hunnicutt, U.S. Assistant Secretary
of Transportation for Aviation and International Affairs, criticized EC Competi-
tion Commissioner Karel Van Miert's proposal to require the BA-AA alliance to
limit flights on certain routes where they would be dominant in order to allow
other airlines to offer competing services. Mr. Hunnicutt was quoted as saying
that "[i] mposing reductions and freezes on network carriers' capacity will exert
upward pressure on fares . . . especially for business passengers." Michael
Skapinker, Rival Regulators in EU and US Air Their Differences, FIN. TIMES LTD.
(LONDON), May 13, 1998, at 4. Mr. Hunnicutt also questioned the Commission's
approach of focusing on single route markets where competition might be re-
stricted instead of on the transatlantic market as a whole where competition may
increase as a result of the alliance offering flights to more destinations. In a
letter to Van Miert, Mr. Hunnicutt noted that approval of alliances by U.S. regula-
tors "is based on the conclusion that the appropriate reference frame for evaluat-
ing their competitive impact is their overall effect on competition in the
transatlantic market, not merely on traffic between any given city-pair." Hun-
nicutt Letter to Van Miert Details Market-Wide Competition Concerns, AVIATION DAILY,
May 6, 1998, at 219. The United States historically has favored a "carrot-and-
stick" approach, whereby antitrust immunity is offered to the airlines of countries
who negotiate an "open skies" deal with the United States. See, e.g., Aviva Freud-
mann, Canada Backs Airlines' Request: US Antitrust Waiver Could Accelerate Bilateral
Open Skies, J. COM., Mar. 15, 1996, at IA. Indeed, the United States has used the
same approach in its review of the BA-AA alliance. See Europeans Dubious on British
Air Alliance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1996, at D6. The approach has been very suc-
cessful for the U.S. in gaining access for its carriers to foreign markets, and no
market is more desirable than the U.S.-U.K. market. See Vance Fort, A U.S. Point
of View, in AIR TRANSPORT LAW AND POLICY IN THE 1990S: CONTROLLING TIHE BOOM
101, 103 (Pablo Mendes de Leon ed., 1991). The U.S. tactic is not simply a case
of diplomatic bullying, however. Indeed, an open skies regime promises greater
access to markets for all carriers and as such is a well-reasoned approach to im-
proving competition in such markets. For an interview with Mr. Van Miert con-
cerning his take on airline alliances including BA-AA, see Louis Jones, When the
Going Gets Tough ... , AIRLINE Bus., May 1998, at 26.
11 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, art. 89, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J.
(C 224) 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
12 In 1996, British Airways led all European airlines in operating results
($1.053 billion), net profit ($865 million), and passenger kilometers (100.6 mil-
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trust systems. 13 Rightly or wrongly, the Commission established
itself as a regulatory body to be taken seriously on both sides of
the Atlantic in a sector where its extraterritorial jurisdiction for
so long had been unclear. 4 As BA and AA look to further ex-
pand their network (the airlines recently announced plans to
add Cathay Pacific, Canadian Airlines, Qantas Airways, and
Iberia to their alliance), 5 the role of the Commission will surely
not be overlooked.
This Article examines the lessons to be learned from the Eu-
ropean Commission's controversial role in reviewing the BA-AA
alliance. It is intended to serve as a brief guide to EC antitrust
review of airline alliances for U.S. and other non-Community
airlines 6 that are contemplating alliances with EC carriers. In
consideration of the Journal's readership, the author has endeav-
ored to provide a practical overview of the relevant substantive
and procedural law relating to the review of such airline alli-
ances." Where appropriate, the author has transcribed or sum-
marized in detail the applicable legal rules. 8
lion, approximately 62.4 million miles). See Alain Buttaud & Jacques Pavaux, 14
AVIATION INDUS. BAROMETER 10, 25, 28 (1997). The same year, American Airlines
ranked first in the world in operating results ($1.331 billion) and fifth in the
world and third in the United States in net profit ($574 million). See id. at 25, 28.
It also ranked second in the world in passenger kilometers (168.2 million kms,
roughly 104.3 million miles). See id. at 10. Initial results from the first half of
1997 indicate continued prosperity for both airlines.
13 In addition to the Commission's review, the alliance was at the same time
being reviewed in the United Kingdom by the Office of Fair Trading and in the
United States by the Department of Transportation.
14 The BA-AA review is the most recent in a line of cases in which the Commis-
sion has sought to flex its legal muscle across Community borders. For an ulti-
mate example of the Commission applying competition law extraterritorially, one
needs to look no further than the Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas merger that
was approved rather routinely in the United States but faced considerable hur-
dles from the European Commission, despite (or perhaps because of) the fact
that both parties were American companies.
15 The alliance will be known as "Oneworld." Helene Cooper, BA, American
Unveil Oneworld Alliance, WALL ST. J. EUR., Sept. 22, 1998, at 14.
16 While transatlantic alliances are currently a hot topic, there is a clear east-
ward trend in the industry as alliances aim to add Asian partners to expand their
networks. The larger alliances have recently been courting top Asian airlines
such as Cathay Pacific and Singapore Airlines, with Cathay Pacific opting to join
BA-AA.
17 Several articles address more generally the application of the EC competi-
tion rules in the air transport sector. See, e.g., Lars Gorton, Air Transport and EC
Competition Law, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 602, (1998).
18 Articles 85, 88, and 89 have been quoted in full, and the key criteria and
thresholds for application of the Merger Regulation have been summarized.
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The first part of this Article reviews the EC competition rules
applicable to cooperative and concentrative arrangements gen-
erally, to airline alliances specifically, and problems inherent in
enforcing these rules extraterritorially as illustrated by the BA-
AA case. The main mechanisms for review of airline alliances
under EC law are Article 85 of the EC Treaty,19 concerning
agreements between companies, and the EC Merger Regula-
tion.2° The Merger Regulation may be applied extraterritori-
ally,21 i.e., to concentrations involving routes outside the EU,
provided the relevant turnover thresholds are met. In practice,
however, the Merger Regulation's application to cross-border
airline alliances is limited because equity partnerships are hin-
dered by laws restricting foreign ownership of domestic air-
lines. 22 Article 85 also has extraterritorial reach. 2' But the
Commission presently lacks a mandate from the EC Member
States to apply Article 85 unilaterally to air transport involving
routes outside the EC, and therefore must rely instead on Arti-
cle 89,24 an obscure, transitional provision of the EC Treaty that
remains in effect in the area of extra-Community air transport.
Concurrently, Member States are entitled to review alliances in-
volving third country routes under both Community law and na-
19 EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85. For lawyers familiar with U.S. antitrust law,
Article 85(1) is the rough equivalent to Section One of the Sherman Act. See
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
20 Council Regulation 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 Amending Regulation 4064/
89 EEC on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1997 O.J. (L
180) 1 (EEC) [hereinafter Merger Regulation].
21 See, e.g., Commission Decision of 18January 1991 Declaring a Concentration
to be Compatible with the Common Market (Case No. IV/M.0050-AT&T/NCR)
According to Council Regulation 4064/89 EEC, 1991 O.J. (C 16) 20, (LEXIS,
Eurcom Library, Eclaw File); Commission Decision of 13 September 1991 Declar-
ing a Concentration to be Compatible with the Common Market (Case No. IV/
M.130-Delta Air Lines/Pan Am) According to Council Regulation 4064/89 EEC,
1991 O.J. (C 289) 14 (LEXIS Eurcom Library, Eclaw File).
22 Foreign ownership of U.S. airlines is limited to 25%, while foreign owner-
ship of airlines in the EC is limited to 49.9%. See Michael Skapinker, Boarding
Business Class Now, FIN. TIMES, July 9, 1998, at 13. As American Airlines' Donald
Carty points out, "There are no flag chemical companies or flag hotel companies,
but there are flag airlines and nations have historically protected them by limit-
ing foreign ownership." Id. "The concept of 'substantial ownership and effective
control' is as old as bilateralism itself .... Whatever its origin or rationale, [the]
nationality clause is, until today, the single most effective barrier to mergers or
take-overs by airlines of different nationality." H. Peter van Fenema, Ownership
Restrictions: Consequences and Steps to be Taken, 23 AIR & SPACE LAw 63 (1998).
23 SeeJoined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117, and 125 to 129/85, Ahlstr6m v. Com-
mission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 4 C.M.L.R. 901 (1988).
24 EC TREATY, supra note 11, art. 89.
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tional law, based on Article 88 of the EC Treaty,25 a counterpart
provision to Article 89. The possibility of concurrent reviews by
the Commission and Member States has given rise to a battle of
competences, which, based on its actions in the BA-AA case, it
appears the Commission is winning by might, if not by right.26
The author then presents a brief overview of the areas of co-
operation envisaged in the BA-AA alliance and the conditions
set forth by the Commission to eliminate the anti-competitive
effects of this cooperation. The author submits that the Com-
mission's review of the BA-AA alliance, while exceptional from a
procedural perspective, at the same time offers legal certainty
from a substantive point of view. A review of the conditions for-
mulated by the Commission regarding the BA-AA alliance, inves-
tigated under Article 89, in relation to those conditions imposed
on other alliances reviewed by the Commission under Article 85
and the Merger Regulation, reveals a common methodological
approach to analyzing the effects of airline alliances on Commu-
nity competition. This approach is discussed here.
Finally, the author examines proposed changes to EC legisla-
tion 27 that would clarify the procedure for applying the EC
competition rules to air transport involving third country routes.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE EC COMPETITION RULES
AND DIVISION OF COMPETENCES APPLICABLE
TO THE REVIEW OF AIRLINE
ALLIANCES
Airline alliances may involve many forms of cooperation rang-
ing from relatively limited agreements (such as joint frequent
flyer programming) to the participation of one airline in an-
other airline's equity. 2 The potential competition concerns
raised by an alliance depend upon the nature and extent of the
relationship, which will also determine the legal mechanism
25 Id. art. 88.
26 See infra Part II.C.3.
27 Specifically, the author will discuss two proposals: an amendment to Council
Regulation 3975/87 and a new regulation complimenting Regulation 3976/87.
See infra Part IV.
28 One author defines the difference as follows: "Alliances consist of two cate-
gories, equity alliances where airlines take equity or part ownership in other carri-
ers, and joint venture alliances where the arrangements between airlines are
limited to specific objectives. The former alliances are wide-ranging, while the
latter have route specific [objectives]." Michael S. Simons, Aviation Alliances: Im-
plications for the Qantas-BA Alliance in the Asia Pacific Region, 62 J. AiR L. & COM.
841, 843 (1997).
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under which the alliance will be reviewed under Community
law.
A. ARTICLE 85 OF THE EC TREATY: THE BASIC PROVISION ON
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN COMPANIES
For airline alliances, just as with agreements between compa-
nies in general, the main mechanism of antitrust review under
Community law is Article 85 of the EC Treaty,29 which states:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market: all agreements between undertakings, deci-
sions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices
which may affect trade between Member States and which have
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition within the common market, and in particular
those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any
other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical develop-
ment, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection
with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Arti-
cle shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared in-
applicable in the case of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between
undertakings;
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of
undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution
of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress,
while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit,
and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which
are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
29 EC TREATY, supra note 11, art. 85.
164
1998] LEARNING TO FLY
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question. 0
The first paragraph of Article 85 prohibits agreements be-
tween companies that may affect trade between Member States
and are either intended to prevent, restrict, or distort competi-
tion or have the effect of doing so. 31 Any agreement infringing
Article 85(1) is automatically void under Article 85(2) .32 How-
ever, there are several possibilities for exemption from Article
85(1), including individual exemption granted by the European
Commission under Article 85(3) for agreements whose benefits
for the consumer outweigh their anti-competitive effects, 3 3 and a
number of so-called "block" exemptions specifically in the area
of air transport. These block exemptions remove certain cate-
gories of agreements from the scope of Article 85(1)
altogether. 4
30 Id.
31 Id. art. 85(1).
32 Id. art. 85(2).
33 Id. art. 85(3).
34 See Commission Regulation 1617/93 of 25 June 1993 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements and Concerted
Practices ConcerningJoint Planning and Coordination of Schedules, Joint Oper-
ations, Consultations on Passenger and Cargo Tariff on Scheduled Air Services
and Slot Allocation at Airports, 1993 O.J. (L 155) 18 (EEC) [hereinafter Commis-
sion Regulation 1617/93]; Commission Regulation 3652/93 of 22 December
1993 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of
Agreements Between Undertakings Relating to Computer Reservation Systems
for Air Transport Services, 1993 O.J. (L 333) 37 (EEC) [hereinafter Commission
Regulation 3652/93]; Commission Regulation 82/91 of 5 December 1990 on the
Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements,
Decisions and Concerted Practices Concerning Ground Handling Services, 1991
O.J. (L 10) 7. The enabling regulation for these block exemptions is Council
Regulation 3976/87 of 14 December 1987 on the Application of Article 85(3) of
the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements and Concerted Practices in the
Air Transport Sector, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 9 (EEC) [hereinafter Council Regulation
3976/87]. See Council Regulation 2344/90 of 24 July 1990 Amending Council
Regulation 3976/87, 1990 O.J. (L 217) 15 (EEC) [hereinafter Council Regula-
tion 2344/90]; Council Regulation 2411/92 of 23 July 1992 Amending Council
Regulation 3976/87, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 19 (EEC) [hereinafter Council Regula-
tion 2411/92].
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B. THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 85(1) TO AIR TRANSPORT
1. Overview
Whether the EC competition rules, including but not limited
to Article 85(1),15 are applicable to air transport was for many
years a contentious issue between the Commission and the ma-
jority of Member States. Ultimately, the answer would be deter-
mined by the European Court of Justice based primarily on an
interpretive reading of the EC Treaty. 6
Articles 74 to 84 of the EC Treaty set out the general rules
governing Community transport, 37 but the Articles only cover
rail, road, and inland waterway transport.3 ' The Treaty ex-
pressly left the fate of air and sea transport to the initiative of
the Council of Ministers, 39 leading most Member States to be-
lieve that the Treaty provisions, including the competition rules,
would not cover air transport until the Council adopted provi-
sions in this area.
In 1962, the Council issued Regulation 1741 implementing
generally Articles 85 and 86, 4' the main competition rules of the
Treaty. Shortly thereafter, however, the Council issued Regula-
,35 Indeed, the EC competition rules are embodied in Articles 85 through 94 of
the EC Treaty. The issue of whether the competition rules are applicable to air
transport was significant not only for Article 85 but notably for Article 86 (con-
cerning abuses of dominant position) and Articles 92-94 (on state aid) as well.
36 See infra note 46 and accompanying text, concerning the Nouvelles Frontidres
judgment.
37 EC TREATY, supra note 11, arts. 74-84.
38 Id. art. 84(1).
39 See id. art. 84(2). "The Council may, acting by qualified majority, decide
whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions may be
laid down for sea and air transport." Id.
40 Council Regulation 17/62 of 6 February 1962 on Exempting Transport from
the Application of Council Regulation 17, 1962 J.O. 17 (EEC) (visited on Nov.
20, 1998) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/sg/consolid/en/362rO017/
artf.htm>[hereinafter Council Regulation 17/62].
41 Article 86 reads:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be
prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it
may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in par-
ticular, consist in: (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair
purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b)
limiting production, markets or technical development to the prej-
udice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing
them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of
contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplemen-
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tion 141,42 retroactively removing transport from the scope of
Regulation 17, although the Commission subsequently held
Regulation 17 to apply still to several businesses ancillary to air
transport, including ground handling 3 and computerized reser-
vation systems.44 Member States took Regulation 141 to mean
that the EC competition rules in general were not applicable to
air transport. After all, Article 84(2) allows the Council to de-
cide "whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropri-
ate provisions may be laid down for.., air transport.""5 Because
the Council issued a regulation that retroactively removed air
transport from the scope of the implementing regulation, many
Member States concluded that the competition rules did not
govern air transport.
The Court of Justice of the European Communities held
otherwise in its 1986 Nouvelles Fronti~res judgment.46 In Nouvelles
Fronti~res, executives of airlines and travel agencies were charged
in France with having violated a French Civil Aviation Code re-
quirement that all tariffs be approved by the French Minister of
Civil Aviation."7 Answering a request for a preliminary ruling 8
tary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
EC TREATY, supra note 11, art. 86. The essence of Article 86 is that it is illegal for
one or more undertakings, having a dominant position within at least a substan-
tial part of the common market, to abuse that position if doing so may affect
trade between Member States. According to the European Court of Justice,
"[e]nterprises are in a dominant position when they have the power to behave
independently, without taking into account, to any substantial extent, their com-
petitors, purchasers and suppliers. . . . It suffices that [this power] is strong
enough to ensure an overall independence of behavior." Case 6/72, Continental
Can, Co., Inc. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215. In practical effect, a market share
of 40% may constitute a dominant position. Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v.
Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207. A market share of over 50% is presumptive proof
of a dominant position. Case 85/76, Hoffmann-LaRoche & Co. v. Commission,
1979 E.C.R. 461. Article 86 usually does not factor into reviews of airline alliance
agreements, with the BA-AA alliance being a notable exception. See infra Part
III.D.
42 Council Regulation 141/62 of 6 February 1962 on Exempting Transport
from the Application of Council Regulation 17, 1962J.O. 141 (EEC) [hereinafter
Council Regulation 141/62].
43 See Commission Decision 85/121 EEC Relating to a Proceeding Under Arti-
cle 11(5) of Council Regulation No. 17, 1985 OJ. (L 46) 51.
44 See Commission Decision 88/589 EEC Relating to a Proceeding Under Arti-
cle 86 of the EEC Treaty, 1988 OJ. (L 317) 47.
45 EC TREATY, supra note 11, art. 84(2).
46 Cases 209-213/84 Ministre Public v. Asjes (Nouvelles Fronti~res), 1986 E.C.R.
1425, 3 C.M.L.R. 173 (1986).
47 Id.
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by the tribunal de police, a French criminal court, the European
Court of Justice held that France's practice of approving tariffs
served to enforce the anticompetitive effects of what amounted
to a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted
practice that would likely infringe Article 85(1) .4" The Court re-
lied on the argument that no provision in the Treaty expressly
excluded the application of the competition rules to transport,
although there was, for example, such an exclusion for the
Common Agricultural Policy.5 ° According to the Court, it could
be inferred that any area not expressly exempted from the com-
petition rules must be considered to be subject to them.5 Fur-
thermore, the Court reasoned that the exclusion of air and sea
transport from the Title of the EC Treaty covering transport
does not exclude these sectors from the remaining general rules
of the Treaty.52 These rules include Articles 85 and 86. The fact
that the implementing regulation did not cover air transport
meant only that the rules set out in the regulation for applying
Articles 85 and 86 were not relevant to air transport.
Therefore, although previous decisions of the Court of Justice
had so foretold, 53 the Nouvelles Fronti~res judgment clearly estab-
lished that air transport could not be considered immune from
the Community competition rules.5" Subsequent Community
48 According to Article 177 of the EC Treaty,
The Court of justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rul-
ings concerning ... the interpretation of this Treaty .... Where
such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on
the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the
Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. Where any such question
is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member
State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under na-
tional law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the
Court of Justice.
EC TREATY, supra note 11, art. 177.
49 See Nouvelles Frontires, 1986 E.C.R. at 1461.
50 See id. at 1465.
51 See id. at 1466.
52 See id. at 1464.
53 See, e.g., Case 167/73 Commission v. French Republic, 1974 E.C.R. 359
(otherwise known as the French Seamen's Case). Here, the Court of Justice stated
that Article 84(2) provides only that the specific rules in the Title of the EC
Treaty dealing with transport shall not apply to air (and sea) transport, but that
these areas remain subject to the general rules of the Treaty. See id. These gen-
eral rules include Articles 85 and 86.
54 Nouvelles Frontires, 1986 E.C.R. at 1425.
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legislation5 5 implemented Articles 85 and 86 with regard to air
transport between and within Member States and empowered
the Commission to grant block exemptions56 for certain kinds of
air transport agreements, decisions, and concerted practices57
that might otherwise infringe Article 85(1).
After determining that Article 85 applies to air transport, it
became clear that most airline alliances, by virtue of constituting
agreements between undertakings that have the effect of re-
stricting competition (at least as between the alliance partners),
would infringe Article 85(1). However, as mentioned above, an
agreement that infringes Article 85(1) may nevertheless avoid
the prohibition of Article 85(2) if it qualifies for an exemption.
There are two types of exemptions: individual exemptions
under Article 85 (3) and block exemptions pursuant to Commis-
sion Regulations.5 8 Block exemptions allow agreements meeting
certain criteria to escape scrutiny under Article 85(1) alto-
gether, while individual exemptions may be sought for agree-
ments that do not qualify for block exemptions and that are
found to have infringed Article 85 (1). Accordingly, when deter-
mining whether an agreement in the air transport sector is likely
to infringe Article 85(1), one must first determine whether a
block exemption applies.
55 Two proposals were adopted as part of the so-called "first package" of legisla-
tion concerning Community air transport: Council Regulation 3975/87 of 14 De-
cember 1987 Laying Down the Procedure for the Application of the Rules on
Competition to Undertakings in the Air Transport Sector, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 1
(EEC) [hereinafter Council Regulation 3975/87] and Council Regulation 3976/
87, supra note 34, at 9. Amendments to these Regulations to extend their scope
to air transport between the Community and non-EC countries are discussed in
Part IV of this article. The "second package," adopted in 1990, included amend-
ments to the block exemption regulations. See Council Regulation 2344/90,
supra note 34 (amending Council Regulation 3976/87). The "third package" in-
cluded a regulation extending the scope of the implementing regulation to do-
mestic air transport within a Member State. See Council Regulation 2408/92 of
23 July 1992 on Access for Community Air Carriers to Intra-Community Air
Routes, art. 3, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 8, 10 (EEC) [hereinafter Council Regulation
2408-92]. See FRANKY DE CONINCK, EUROPEAN AIR LAW: NEW SKIES FOR EUROPE
27-54, 65-84, 91-115 (1992) for more information on these three packages.
56 See Council Regulation 3976/87, supra note 34.
57 For more on block exemptions, see infra Part II.B.2.
58 Most general treatises on EC competition law discuss with some detail the
various means of exemption. See, e.g., Ivo VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANCOIS BELLIS,
COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1994); CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY
& GRAHAM CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION (1993); VALENTINE
KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE (1994).
For a particularly useful guide on block exemptions, see ROSA GREAVES, EC
BLOCK EXEMPTION REGULATIONS (1994).
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2. Block Exemptions
Block exemptions provide that certain types of commercial
agreements that are generally likely to meet the criteria of Arti-
cle 85(3) will be held to fall outside the scope of Article 85(1)
and therefore will not be prohibited, provided they meet the
criteria of the block exemption. Agreements that fall within the
ambit of a block exemption do not need to be notified to the
Commission. The reasons for having such block exemptions are
varied but certainly a significant consideration is economy. The
Commission is simply not equipped to review all agreements
that infringe Article 85(1) and therefore must exempt those
that are less likely to pose significant problems in order to
devote the necessary attention to the more serious
infringements.
The Commission may adopt legislation exempting certain cat-
egories of agreements in a given sector once the Council has
enabled it to do so. In the air transport sector, the enabling
regulation is Council Regulation 3976/87, 5 as amended by
Council Regulation 2344/9060 and Council Regulation 2411/
92.61
The Commission has issued two block exemptions of particu-
lar importance to airline alliances: Regulations 1617/9362 and
3652/93.63 According to these block exemptions, Article 85(1)
in general shall not apply to agreements concerning: joint plan-
ning and schedule coordination of intra-Community flights;64
joint operation of scheduled air service on new or low-density
intra-Community routes;65 tariff consultations on intra-Commu-
nity routes;66  slot allocation concerning intra-Community
routes;6 7 and development and operation of computerized res-
ervation systems (CRSs), including co-purchase or co-develop-
ment of a CRS,68 creation of a system vendor to market and
59 Council Regulation 3976/87, supra note 34.
6o Council Regulation 2344/90, supra note 34.
6i1 Council Regulation 2411/92, supra note 34.
62 Commission Regulation 1617/93, supra note 34.
63 Commission Regulation 3652/93, supra note 34. Commission Regulation
82/91, 1991 O.J. (L 10) 7 (EEC) exempting certain agreements in the ground-
handling sector is not discussed here as ground-handling services generally are
not integral to airline alliances.
64 See Commission Regulation 1617/93, supra note 34, art. 2, at 19-20.
65 See id. art. 3, at 20.
66 See id. art. 4, at 20-21.
67 See id. art. 5, at 21-22.
68 See Commission Regulation 3652/93, supra note 34, art. 1 (a), at 38.
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operate the CRS,69 and regulation of the provision of distribu-
tion facilities by the CRS vendor or by distributors.70
Again, the above restrictions on competition must meet the
criteria of the relevant block exemption regulation in order to
qualify for exemption. For example, although Regulation
1617/93 shields joint planning and schedule coordination from
Article 85(1), it does not protect carriers that enter into agree-
ments to set prices or share capacity.71 Also, the CRS exemp-
tions in Regulation 3652/93 only apply to systems that are
operated in an equal and non-discriminatory way.72 Because
these criteria are rather technical, companies that consider that
their agreement falls within the scope of one of these block ex-
emptions would nevertheless be advised to consult an EC lawyer.
It is important to note that the Regulation 1617/93 exemp-
tion in particular, in addition to having a limited scope, refers
expressly to intra-Community flights and does not cover agree-
ments involving third-country routes. Therefore, an alliance be-
tween a European carrier and a U.S. carrier currently does not
benefit from this block exemption. The proposed extension of
the scope of the block exemptions to cover third-country routes
is examined further in Part IV.
3. Individual Exemptions
If an agreement does not qualify for a block exemption and
violates Article 85(1), it may still be exempted if it satisfies the
requirements of Article 85(3). Article 85(3) provides that Arti-
cle 85(1) may be declared inapplicable if the following condi-
tions are met: the agreement leads to the improvement of the
production or distribution of goods or promotion of technical
or economic progress; the agreement allows consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit; the agreement only imposes re-
strictions that are indispensable to its objectives; and the agree-
ment does not eliminate competition.73
In practice, even where the above conditions are satisfied, in-
dividual exemptions under Article 85(3) are rarely issued."
More commonly, the Commission will issue a so-called "comfort
letter" to the parties concerned, announcing that it has no rea-
69 See id. art. 1 (b).
70 See id. art. 1 (c).
71 Commission Regulation 1617/93, supra note 34, art. 3(e), at 20.
72 Commission Regulation 3652/93, supra note 34, art. 3(1), at 39.
73 EC TREATY, supra note 11, art. 85(3).
74 See VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 58, at 777-79.
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son to intervene in the agreement and that, unless there is a
material change of circumstances, no further action will be
taken. v5 Parties may request a formal exemption, but because it
may take the Commission years to issue such an exemption,76 in
most cases companies are content to receive a comfort letter.
C. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE EC
COMPETITION RULES TO AIR TRANSPORT INVOLVING
THIRD COUNTRY ROUTES
1. Background
Based on the 1986judgment of the European Court of Justice
in Nouvelles Frontires77 and subsequent legislation,78 it is clear
that the provisions of Article 85 apply to air transport between
and within Member States of the Community. Furthermore, it is
well established that EC competition law in general may be ap-
plied extraterritorially, so long as the place of implementation
of the conduct at issue is within the Community.79 As concerns
air transport between the Community and third countries such
as the United States, however, there is no implementing regula-
tion in place to allow the Commission to apply Article 85(1) uni-
laterally or to grant exemptions under Article 85(3).
In 1989 the Court of Justice indicated in the Ahmed Saeed
case8" that the EC competition rules in principle apply to air
transport between Member States and non-Member States.8
Nevertheless, the Court stopped short of finding that the Com-
mission had the external competence to apply Article 85 unilat-
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 Cases 209-213/84 Minist~re Public v. Asjes (Nouvelles Frontiires), 1986 E.C.R.
1425, 1444.
78 See Council Regulation 3975/87, supra note 55 (implementing the competi-
tion rules to air transport between Member States); Council Regulation 2410/92
of 23 July 1992 Amending Regulation 3975/87 Laying Down the Procedure for
the Application of the Rules on Competition to Undertakings in the Air Trans-
port Sector, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 18 (EEC) [hereinafter Council Regulation 2410/
92] (extending the implementing regulation to domestic air transport).
79 See Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117, and 125 to 129/85, Ahlstr6m
Osakyhtio v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 901 (1988).
American practitioners will recognize this as a rendition of the "effects test." See,
e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 610 (6th Cir.
1976) ("It is the effect on American foreign commerce which is usually cited to
support extraterritorial jurisdiction.").
80 Case 66/86, Re Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen, 1989 E.C.R. 803, [1990] 4
C.M.L.R. 102 (1990).
"I See id. at 822.
172
LEARNING TO FLY
erally to air transport to and from third countries absent a
Council Regulation authorizing it to do so.8 12 Therefore, in
terms of the extraterritorial application of Community competi-
tion law to air transport involving third country routes, it can be
said that Article 85 applies; however, the Commission currently
lacks the exclusive right to apply it.
2. Articles 88 and 89
This brings into play Articles 88 and 89 of the EC Treaty,
which, other than in the field of air transport between Member
States and third countries, have been rendered obsolete by the
implementation of the competition rules by Regulation 17.3
The reason for the importance of these Articles is the absence of
a mandate for the Commission to apply Article 85 unilaterally in
air transport between Member States and third countries. Re-
call that Regulation 14184 retroactively removed air transport
from the scope of the general implementation regulation 5 and
that the regulation implementing the competition rules in the
area of air transport,86 along with subsequent legislation,8 7 only
applies these rules to intra-Community routes.
The importance of Articles 88 and 89 to the review of transat-
lantic airline alliances such as BA-AA merits quoting these Arti-
cles in full.
Article 88 provides:
Until the entry into force of the provisions adopted in pursuance
of Article 87, the authorities in [Member States] shall rule on the
admissibility of agreements, decisions and concerted practices
and on abuse of a dominant position in the common market in
accordance with the law of their country and with the provisions
of Article 85, in particular paragraph 3, and of Article 86.88
Article 89 reads:
82 See id. at 823.
83 Articles 88 and 89 are not obsolete in the air transport sector because Coun-
cil Regulation 141/62 removed air transport from the scope of the main imple-
menting regulation (Council Regulation (EEC) 17/62) and because the
implementing regulation in the field of air transport (Council Regulation (EEC)
3975/87) is limited to intra-Community air transport.
84 Council Regulation 141/62, supra note 42.
85 See Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 40.
86 See Council Regulation 3975/87, supra note 55.
87 See Council Regulation 2408/92, supra note 55.
88 EC TREATY, supra note 11, art. 88.
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1. Without prejudice to Article 88, the Commission shall, as soon
as it takes up its duties, ensure the application of the principles
laid down in Articles 85 and 86. On application by a [Member
State] or on its own initiative, and in co-operation with the com-
petent authorities in the [Member States], who shall give it their
assistance, the Commission shall investigate cases of suspected in-
fringement of these principles. If it finds that there has been an
infringement, it shall propose appropriate measures to bring it to
an end.
2. If the infringement is not brought to an end, the Commission
shall record such infringement of the principles in a reasoned
decision. The Commission may publish its decision and
authori[z]e [Member States] to take the measures, the condi-
tions and details of which it shall determine, needed to remedy
the situation.89
Article 88 is a transitional provision meant to allow national
competition authorities to retain the right to rule on agree-
ments and abuses of dominant position in areas where Articles
85 and 86 have not yet been implemented. Most significantly,
Article 88 allows Member States to provide an exemption under
Article 85(3) to alliances involving their own national carriers.90
Under Article 89, the Commission may act under Articles 85
and 86 but must rely on the cooperation of national competi-
tion authorities. 91 This has created numerous conflicts between
the Commission and Member State authorities, most notably the
ongoing feud between the Commission and the United King-
dom over the proposed alliance between British Airways and
American Airlines.92
Based on the Nouvelles Fronti~res and Ahmed Saeed judgments
and Community legislation to date, the following can be said
regarding the application of the EC competition rules to air
transport between Member States and third countries. First, the
competition rules apply to the entire field of air transport, in-
cluding routes between Member States,9" within Member
States,"4 and between Member States and third countries 5 such
89 Id. art. 89.
90 Id. art. 88.
91 Id. art. 89(1).
92 See discussion infra Part III.C.3.
93S See Cases 209-213/84, Minist~re Public v. Asjes (Nouvelles Frontieres), 1986
E.C.R. 1425, 1433; Council Regulation 3975/87, supra note 55.
94 See Council Regulation 2408/92, supra note 55.
95 See Case 66/86, ReAhmed Saeed Flugreisen, 1989 E.C.R. 803, 822-23, [1990]
4 C.M.L.R. 102 (1990).
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as the United States. However, in sectors where there is no im-
plementing regulation (as is the case with air transport involving
third country routes), the Commission may not act unilaterally
under Article 85.96 In such cases, the national competition au-
thorities and the Commission may act concurrently under Arti-
cles 88 and 89. 97  Member States may apply national
competition law in reviewing an alliance, even when the Com-
mission is conducting its own investigation of the same alliance,
but may not do so in a manner that undermines the application
of Community law.9" The Commission may conduct an investi-
gation under Article 89, but must do so in cooperation with na-
tional authorities.99 Under the transitional regime of Articles 88
and 89, the Member States alone may grant an Article 85(3)
exemption.100 Finally, agreements in the air transport sector are
void only when national competition authorities hold that they
violate Article 85(1) and do not qualify for an exemption or,
apparently, when the Commission has recorded an infringe-
ment pursuant to Article 89(2). ' o0
96 See Nouvelles Frontires, 1986 E.C.R. at 1466-67.
97 See id. at 1467-68.
98 This is a corollary to the well-established supremacy principle of Community
law that national law may be applied even where it is inconsistent with Commu-
nity law, but where there is an actual conflict between national law and Commu-
nity law, Community law prevails.
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general
or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of
this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the
Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Commu-
nity's tasks. They shall refrain from any measure which could jeop-
ardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.
EC TREA%, supra note 11, art. 5.
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having... powers
stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers
from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus
created a body of law which binds both their nationals and
themselves.
Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593.; see also Case 106/77, Sim-
menthal, 1978 E.C.R. 629, 643 (provisions of the Treaty and directly applicable
measures of the institutions "render automatically inapplicable any conflicting
provision of ... national law.").
- See Nouvelles Frontires, 1986 E.C.R. at 1468.
100 See id.
101 See Re Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen, 1989 E.C.R. at 846-47. The fact that an agree-
ment may be void based on the Commission having recorded an infringement
runs counter to the wording in the Treaty. See infra note 106 and accompanying
text.
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3. Battle of Competences
The Commission's role should then be that of a good referee. In
sports the best referees are those who blow their whistles with
economy, limiting their intervention in the game to a minimum
to avoid interrupting the play unnecessarily and destroying its
natural flow and rhythm. In doing so they apply the rules and do
not change them or invent new ones. We expect the same from
the Commission, and we particularly want them to refrain from
creating their own rules and interpretations as they go along.
This, however, seems not to be the case." 2
The lack of legal clarity in the application of Articles 88 and
89 has resulted in a heated constitutional battle between Mem-
ber States and the Commission. In no case has the fervor
reached a higher level than in the British Airways-American Air-
lines review. Simultaneous investigations of the BA-AA alliance
have been conducted by the Commission, the U.K. Office of
Fair Trading, and the U.S. Department of Transportation. Each
regulatory body has taken a different approach to the alliance,
each suggesting different conditions in exchange for clearance,
creating a very difficult predicament for the two airlines.
Although negotiations are still ongoing, the Commission ap-
pears to have won its battle of competences with the U.K., if by
political might alone. Whether the Commission has acted le-
gally is another question altogether.
A comparison of the powers conveyed to the Commission and
the Member States through Articles 88 and 89 suggests that na-
tional authorities have the right to take the lead in such investi-
gations, with the Commission limited to playing a supporting
role. Article 89, after all, applies " [w] ithout prejudice to Article
88."' 13 Furthermore, under Articles 88 and 89, only Member
States have the express right to rule on agreements and to grant
exemptions under Article 85(3).'0° Finally, the Commission is
restricted in that it must act "in co-operation with the competent
authorities in the [Member States]." 0 5 A strict reading of the
Treaty seems to weigh in the favor of the Member States.
102 Karl-Heinz Neumeister, Secretary General of the Association of European
Airlines, Remarks at "Meeting the Global Challenge: The Outlook for Civil Avia-
tion in the EU" (Jan. 27, 1998) (transcript on file with author).
103 EC TREATY, supra note 11, art. 89(1).
104 See Nouvelles Frontiires, 1986 E.C.R. at 1467.
105 EC TREATY, supra note 11, art. 89(1). Article 89 provides that the Commis-
sion should act "in co-operation with the competent authorities in the Member
States, who shall give it their assistance." Id.
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The Court of Justice, however, has taken a rather dubious
stance, holding in Ahmed Saeed that an agreement may be pro-
hibited and ruled void under Article 85 either if the national
authorities have found that it falls within the prohibition of Arti-
cle 85(1) and does not qualify for an exemption under Article
85(3), or alternatively, if the Commission has recorded an in-
fringement pursuant to Article 89(2).106 It is difficult to see how
this latter alternative has foundation in the wording of Article
89. On its face, Article 89 permits the Commission only to inves-
tigate with the assistance of the Member State,1" 7 to propose measures
to bring infringements to an end,10 8 to record infringements that
are not brought to an end,10 9 and to authorize Member States to
take measures to remedy the situation.110 While the Commis-
sion may investigate, propose, record, and authorize, under Arti-
cle 88, Member States alone are entitled to rule on the
admissibility of agreements."'
The better view, it would seem, is that national authorities
should play the more prominent role in reviewing alliances in-
volving third country routes. In the case of BA-AA, this would
mean that the United Kingdom, not the Commission, would be
entitled to set out the conditions for approval of the alliance
provided these conditions in no way jeopardize the effectiveness
of Community law. But the judgment of the Court of Justice in
Ahmed Saeed has complicated the situation and the Commission,
intent on leaving no gaps in its enforcement of the EC competi-
tion rules, has acted boldly in reviewing the alliance. Indeed,
the Commission has even threatened to sue the United King-
dom before the Court of Justice if the U.K. ruling undermines
Community law.' 1 2 Considering the Court's judgment in Ahmed
Saeed, this is not a case the U.K. would be likely to win.
D. THE MERGER REGULATION
While Article 85(1) is the general provision applying to agree-
ments between companies, it will not apply to mergers and
other concentrations that are held to be of sufficient financial
106 Re Ahmed Saeed Jiugreisen, 1989 E.C.R. at 846-47.
107 EC TREATY, supra note 11, art. 89(1).
108 See id.
lo9 See id. art. 89(2).
110 See id.
III Id. art. 88.
112 See Michele Kayal, BA-AA Alliance Hearings Fail to Sway EU Officials, J. COM.,
Feb. 5, 1997, at 2B.
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importance to the Community." The legality of such concen-
trations will be reviewed instead under the EC Merger Regula-
tion. I 4 In the field of air transport, the Merger Regulation may
apply to alliances involving an equity participation. Such alli-
ances are allowed, provided they do not create or strengthen a
dominant market position of the airlines involved in the
concentration. "5
The Merger Regulation applies to all concentrations having a
Community dimension." 6 A concentration is defined to in-
clude the following: mergers between two or more independent
companies;"' the acquisition of control by one or more compa-
nies directly or indirectly of part or whole of another com-
pany; 1 8 and certain joint ventures which perform as an
autonomous economic entity on a lasting basis." 9
Community dimension is determined solely on whether the
concentration has sufficient world-wide and Community-wide
turnover. A concentration will be considered to have a Commu-
nity dimension if: the combined aggregate world-wide turnover
of all the companies concerned is more than ECU 5,000 mil-
lion 120 and each of at least two of the companies have an aggre-
gate Community-wide turnover of more than ECU 250
million 121 unless each of the companies concerned achieves
more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover
within one and the same Member State. 122
In addition, under the recent amendments to the Merger
Regulation,'2 3 a concentration that does not meet the above
thresholds will still be considered to have a Community dimen-
113 See, e.g., BARRY E. HAWK & HENRY L. HUSER, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MERGER
CONTROL: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 338 (1996). Although somewhat outdated af-
ter the recent amendments to the Merger Regulation, the Hawk and Huser book
remains one of the most valued treatises in the field. See also C.J. COOK & C.S.
KERSE, E.C. MERGER CONTROL (1996).
14 See Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 14 (EEC) as amended
by Merger Regulation, supra note 20 [hereinafter Council Regulation 4064/89].
115 See id.
11; See id.
117 See id. art. 3(1)(a).
'1 See id. art. 3(1)(b).
119 See id. art. 3(2).
120 See id. art. 1 (2) (a). At the rate of exchange on 31 July 1998 (ECU 1 = US $
1.1073), this would equate to approximately US $ 5537 million.
121 See id. art. 1(2)(b). This would equate to approximately US $ 277 million.
122 See id. art. 1 (2) (b).
123 Merger Regulation, supra note 20.
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sion when: the combined aggregate global turnover of all the
companies concerned exceeds ECU 2,500 million; 12 in each of
at least three Member States, the combined aggregate turnover
of all of the companies concerned exceeds ECU 100 million; 25
in each of at least three Member States for which the second
criterion is satisfied, the aggregate turnover of each of at least
two of the companies exceeds ECU 25 million; 26 and the aggre-
gate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the
companies exceeds ECU 100 million, 127 unless more than one
such undertaking concerned achieves more than two-thirds of
its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the
same Member State. 128
Because much airline turnover is derived from cross-border
flights, the Commission has had to consider how to determine
the countries to which turnover for a given route should be at-
tributed. The Commission has devised three main approaches:
(1) attributing 100% of ticket revenues to the country of desti-
nation, (2) attributing half of ticket revenues to the country of
origin and half to the country of destination, and (3) attributing
all revenues to the country where the sale of the ticket oc-
curred.1 2 9 In the Swissair-Sabena merger, °3 0 the Commission
used the third approach,13 1 and indeed seems to be favoring a
"country of sale" test over the other two alternatives. The appli-
cation of this test could remove a significant number of cases
from the scope of the Merger Regulation because Member State
airlines are fairly likely to generate over two-thirds of their turn-
over from sales made within their home country.
Concentrations having a Community dimension will be re-
viewed under the Merger Regulation by the Merger Task Force,
124 See Merger Regulation, supra note 20, art. 1 (3) (a). At the rate of exchange
on 31 July 1998 (ECU 1 = US $ 1.1073), this would equate to approximately US $
2769 million.
125 See id. art. 1(3)(b) (approximately US $111 million).
126 See id. art. 1 (3) (c) (approximately US $28 million).
127 See id. art. 1 (3) (d) (approximately US $111 million).
128 See id. art. 1 (3).
-2 See, e.g., Commission Decision of 13 September 1991 Declaring a Concen-
tration to be Compatible with the Common Market (Case No. IV/M.130-Delta
Air Lines/Pan Am) According to Council Regulation 4064/89 EEC, 1991 O.J. (C
289) 14 (LEXIS Eurcom Library, Eclaw File).
130 See infra Part III.C.
131 See Commission Decision of 20 July 1995 Declaring a Concentration to be
Compatible with the Common Market (Case No. IV/M.616-Swissair/Sabena
(II)) According to Council Regulation 4064/89, 1995 O.J. (C 200) 10 (EEC)
(LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Eclaw File).
1998]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
a specialized unit within the Commission's Directorate-General
for competition, DG-IV. -13 2 If the agreement does not constitute
a concentration, but instead a cooperation, the Merger Regula-
tion will not apply, and the agreement may be subject instead to
Article 85(1). Where the agreement does constitute a concen-
tration, but does not have a Community dimension, it may be
subject to national merger control law 3 3 and may need to be
notified in a number of jurisdictions. An advantage of the
Merger Regulation is that it allows for "one-stop shopping" for
companies whose concentration has a Community dimension.
If an alliance falls within the scope of the Merger Regulation,
the Merger Task Force will examine whether the alliance creates
or strengthens a dominant market position1 4 of the carriers in-
volved. If so, it will be prohibited under the Merger Regulation,
unless the parties can offer commitments that would eliminate
these problems.
Unlike the Commission's limited external competence with
respect to reviews under Article 85, the Commission's compe-
tence in reviews under the Merger Regulation is not dependent
on whether the alliance relates to intra-Community routes or
third-country routes. 3 5 The Commission has reviewed concen-
trations in many economic sectors under the Merger Regulation
involving non-EU companies, perhaps most notably that be-
tween two American companies, Boeing and McDonnell-
Douglas.
132 See VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 58, at 486-87. The Merger Task Force
(MTF) has its own registry, internal organisation, management system and work-
ing methods. Id.
133 The Commission generally will not intervene under Article 85 or, more ap-
propriately, Article 86, with respect to concentrations falling below the turnover
thresholds. See HAWK & HUSER, supra note 113, at 338.
134 While there is no rule concerning how high market share must be to create
a dominant position, the Commission has never found a dominant position to
exist when the combined market shares of the parties were below 40%. Depend-
ing on other market factors such as potential competition and relative bargaining
or buying power of customers, companies may have market shares exceeding
40% without having a dominant position.
135 See, e.g., Commission Decision of 13 September 1991 Declaring a Concen-
tration to be Compatible with the Common Market (Case No. IV/M.130-Delta
Air Lines/Pan Am) According to Council Regulation 4064/89 EEC, 1991 O.J. (C
289) 14 (LEXIS Eurcom Library, Eclaw File).
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III. A COMPARISON OF THE COMMISSION'S REVIEW OF
THE BA-AA ALLIANCE WITH ITS REVIEWS OF
OTHER MAJOR AIRLINE ALLIANCES
"If this alliance is allowed to go ahead, it would be the equivalent of a
merger between Coke and Pepsi, Nike and Reebok, or General Motors
and Ford. "136
In general, it can be said that the Commission, in its review of
airline alliances, will consider whether sustainable competition
from other airlines will remain or can develop once the alliance
is in place. In order to determine whether such competition
exists, the Commission may look at different aspects of the rele-
vant market, such as the number of airlines operating on a given
route, the frequency of flights on this route, and the availability
of take-off and landing slots at the relevant airports. The Com-
mission will also consider the specific provisions of the alliance
agreement concerning, inter alia, interlining 37 with other carri-
ers and frequent flyer programming.
The legal mechanism used by the Commission to review an
alliance depends on the form of the alliance. Alliances involv-
ing cooperation between airlines within the Community that fall
short of equity sharing will most likely be evaluated under Arti-
cle 85 of the EC Treaty. An example of such a review is the
Commission's review of the SAS-Lufthansa alliance. 138 Where
such alliances involve routes outside of the Community, the
Commission must act under Article 89 of the Treaty, with Mem-
ber State authorities likely reviewing the alliance pursuant to Ar-
136 Carole A. Shifrin, American, BA Await Decision on Alliance, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Oct. 14, 1996, at 34 (quoting Richard Branson, Virgin Atlantic Air-
ways Chairman). In his trademark understated manner, Branson has labeled the
alliance "the merger from hell." Karen Walker, Two Bobs Stir the Immunity Debate,
AIRLINE Bus., May 1998, at 90. For reasons that have already been discussed in
this Article, see supra Part II.D, the BA-AA alliance does not, in a legal sense,
constitute a merger.
137 Interlining is the practice whereby one airline accepts tickets issued in the
name of another airline. See, e.g., BERNARDINE ADKINS, AIR TRANSPORT AND E.C.
COMPETITION LAW 30 (1994).
138 See Commission Decision of 16 January 1996 Relating to a Proceeding
Under Article 85 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (IV/
35.545-LH/SAS), 1996 O.J. (L 54) 28. The Commission has since reviewed the
alliance between Lufthansa, SAS and United Airlines under Article 89, published
in the Official Journal on the same day as the BA-AA notice. See Commission
Notice Concerning the Alliance Between Lufthansa, SAS and United Airlines,
1998 O.J. (C 239) 5.
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ticle 88. The British Airways-American Airlines1"9 alliance is the
most significant example to date of an Article 89 review. Finally,
when an alliance takes the form of a concentration and has
Community-wide and global turnover sufficient to give it a Com-
munity dimension, it will be reviewed under the Merger Regula-
tion. Although most cross-border airline alliances are
cooperative, not concentrative, the Sabena-Swissairl4" alliance is
a good example of a review under the Merger Regulation of an
equity alliance between a Community carrier and a non-Com-
munity carrier.
The following pages provide a summary of the Commission's
reviews of these airline alliances. As will become evident, while
the procedural aspects of these reviews differ significantly, there
is notably very little difference in the philosophical approach
taken by the Commission in these cases, as reflected in the con-
ditions imposed.
A. THE COMMISSION'S ASSESSMENT OF AN ALLIANCE INVOLVING
Ti-iiiD COUNTRY ROUTES: BA-AA
In the past year, the Commission's plate has been full, as it
has investigated no less than four major airline alliances under
Article 89 of the EC Treaty. In addition to its review of British
Airways-American Airlines, indisputably the most significant of
the bunch, the Commission has also suggested conditions for
approval of Lufthansa, United, SAS"' and is expected to issue
comments shortly on the KLM-Northwest and Delta, Sabena,
Swissair, Austrian Airlines alliances.1 42 Although the specific as-
pects of these alliances vary, basic provisions include codeshar-
ing, joint advertising and selling, joint frequent flyer
programming, flight and schedule coordination, co-operation
of computerized reservation systems, co-marking, joint product
development, and joint cargo services.
The proposed BA-AA alliance contemplates such an expansive
collaboration between the parties that EC competition commis-
13) See Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance Between British Airways
and American Airlines, 1998 OJ. (C 239) 10.
140 See Commission Decision of 20 July 1995 Declaring a Concentration to be
Compatible with the Common Market (Case No. IV/M.616-Swissair/Sabena
(II)) According to Council Regulation 4064/89, 1995 O.J. (C 200) 10 (EEC)
(LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Eclaw File).
141 See Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance Between Lufthansa, SAS,
and United Airlines, 1998 O.J. (C 239) 5.
142 SeeJones, supra note 10, at 28.
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sioner Karel Van Miert has referred to the alliance as a "near
merger."' 14 3 The BA-AA agreement provides for cooperation in
the following areas:
Codesharing BA and AA will codeshare on their North At-
lantic services. Insofar as permitted by various competition
authorities, they will also codeshare world-wide, with plans
to include affiliate airlines in the codesharing scheme as
well; 144
Revenues- BA and AA "will employ similar internal prora-
tion processes to distribute revenues... to the North Atlan-
tic alliance services... and to all non-alliance segments for
connecting itineraries involving services operated by [BA or
AA] " ;145
Pricing BA and AA will price common products in the
same manner, with AA pricing alliance segments from the
United States to Europe and BA pricing alliance segments
from Europe to the United States. 146
Joint Scheduling. BA and AA will jointly schedule the alli-
ance services for the North Atlantic routes and "will use rea-
sonable efforts to coordinate the schedules of their North
Atlantic alliance services with the schedules of their code-
shared flights out of their respective homeland gateways"; 47
Display in Computerized Reservation Systems (CRS): BA and
AA will use reasonable efforts to assure that both BA and
AA services are displayed simultaneously on flights covered
by the alliance;148
Co-marking BA and AA will use a mutually agreed mark to
represent the alliance and frequent flyer linkage;149
Co-development of product: BA and AA will coordinate prod-
uct development;150
143 See id.
144 These include American Eagle and Brymon Airways, Deutsche BA, and
TAT European Airlines. See Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance Agree-
ment Between British Airways and American Airlines, 1996 O.J. (C 289) 4.
145 Id. at 4-5.
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Frequent Flyer Programming (FEP): BA and AA will create a
fully reciprocal FFP relationship which will offer points ac-
crual and redemption;" 1
Joint-selling. BA and AA will coordinate the selling of their
product in both Europe and the United States;152
Shared facilities: BA and AA will share airport facilities to
the extent possible;' 53 and
Cargo: BA and AA will create a cargo alliance which will
include all of their current and future services between Eu-
rope and the United States, and between Europe, Latin
America, and the Caribbean.
54
In order to make the BA-AA agreement compatible with the
EC competition rules, the Commission has proposed the follow-
ing measures:
Reduction in frequencies: For the first six months after approval
of the alliance, 55 on the three hub-to-hub routes 56 where the
alliance would be dominant (London-Dallas, London-Miami
and London-Chicago), BA and AA, if requested by a competitor,
should "reduce their combined number of weekly frequencies
so as to allow their competitors to operate up to 55% of frequen-
cies on [these routes] ."'5 Based on the current level of flights,
this means that if a competitor wishes to expand its presence or
to develop new services on these markets and so requests, BA
and AA would need to reduce their frequencies by twelve on the
London Heathrow-Chicago route, eight on the London
Gatwick-Dallas route, and five on the London-Miami route.1
58
The alliance should relinquish, without compensation, the same
number of slots as it previously used for the frequencies it gives







155 See Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance Between British Airways
and American Airlines, 1998 O.J. (C 239) 10, 11.
156 BA has its hub in London, while AA has hubs in Dallas, Miami, and
Chicago.
157 Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance Between British Airways and
American Airlines, 1998 O.J. (C 239) 10, 10-11.





Relinquishment of take-off and landing slots: The airlines are ex-
pected to give up, without compensation, as many as 267 take-
off and landing slots at London's Heathrow and Gatwick air-
ports in order to allow competitor airlines, so requesting, to
launch a new service or to expand existing services on the
London-U.S. routes.160 Specifically, the parties would need to
give up as many as 200 slots at Heathrow for non-hub-to-hub
services,16 seventeen slots at Gatwick' 6 2 for non-hub-to-hub-serv-
ices, and an additional fifty slots for hub-to-hub routes. 163 In ar-
riving at this number, the Commission used a formula designed
to ensure that competitors would control 55% of these slots. 164
Interlining- BA and AA should allow other American and Euro-
pean airlines to enter into interlining agreements with them. 165
Frequent Flyer Programming- BA and AA either should refrain
from operating joint frequent flyer programs between the
United Kingdom and the United States and from allowing pas-
sengers to transfer points between the airlines, or should allow
other airlines without comparable frequent flyer programs to
join the BA-AA frequent flyer program. 166
Display in Computerized Reservation Systems (CRS): The Commis-
sion is still investigating whether concurrent listings on a CRS
screen of BA and AA flights that are operated under a code-
sharing arrangement is likely to have the effect of filling the first
screen to the detriment of competitors, but suggests that CRS
listings of such code-shared flights should be limited to one
line. 6
Relations with Travel Agencies: BA and AA "should not include a
system of remuneration that has the effect of securing the loy-
alty of travel agents to the members of the alliance on the rele-
vant markets."168
160 See id. at 12.
161 See id.
162 See id.
1653 See id. at 14. These slots would be divided as follows: 24 slots for London-
Chicago, 16 for London-Dallas and 10 for London-Miami.
- See id. at 12. The slot formula is as follows: (the number of slots to be given up by
BA-AA) = (the number of BA-AA slots used on London-U.S. routes in 1997 / 0.45) x
0.55 - (the number of competitors' slots used on London-US routes in 1997). See id.
165 See id. at 15.
166 See id. at 14.
167 See id. at 15.
1 Id. BA has been accused by rival airlines in Europe of operating an incen-
tive system whereby travel agents would be rewarded for selling above the sales
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In addition, the Commission stated that it would expect an
undertaking from the United Kingdom to "permit any Commu-
nity carrier established in the EEA 169 to operate direct and indi-
rect services between any airport in its territory and the United
States, setting its fares freely,"1 0 in other words to allow for mul-
tiple carrier designation.
B. THE COMMISSION'S ASSESSMENT OF AN ALLIANCE UNDER
ARTICLE 85: SAS-Lu~rH-ANSA
A number of airline alliances have been evaluated under Arti-
cle 85 (1), but for reasons already explained, these alliances have
involved Community routes flown by Community carriers only.
The most significant alliance to date evaluated under Article 85
was the one between Lufthansa and SAS.' 7' After the parties re-
quested the Commission to find that their agreement did not
infringe Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty or, alternatively, that it
qualified for an individual exemption under Article 85(3),172
the Commission sent Lufthansa and SAS a letter notifying them
that there were "serious doubts" of the alliance's compatibility
with the common market. 173 However, instead of prohibiting
the agreement on the grounds that it prevented, restricted, or
distorted competition under Article 85(1), the Commission con-
cluded that if certain conditions were agreed, the benefits of the
alliance would outweigh its possible anti-competitive effects. 7 1
Ultimately, the Commission granted an individual exemption
under Article 85 (3),175 but only after insisting on numerous con-
ditions applying to the eight largest routes 76 where SAS and
Lufthansa competed prior to their alliance, 7 including: a
freeze on the number of daily flights offered on routes where a
level of the same month in the previous year. See Judge Hears Oral Arguments in
Virgin Anti-trust Case Against BA, AGENCE FRANCE PR~ssE, Feb. 13, 1998.
169 The European Economic Area (EEA) includes the fifteen EC Member
States plus Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein.
170 Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance Between British Airways and
American Airlines, 1998 O.J. (C 239) 10, 15.
171 See Commission Decision IV/35.545, supra note 138.
172 See id.
173 Id.
174 See id. at 37-40.
175 See id. art. 1.
176 These included the Dfisseldorf-Copenhagen, Dasseldorf-Stockholm, Frank-
furt-Copenhagen, Frankfurt-Gothenburg, Frankfurt-Oslo, Frankfurt-Stockholm,
Hamburg-Stockholm, and Munich-Copenhagen routes. See id. art. 2.2.
177 See id. at 37.
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new entrant decides to compete;1 78 the relinquishment of a sig-
nificant number of slots at the airports of Frankfurt, Dfisseldorf,
Stockholm and Oslo; 179 an obligation to allow other airlines to
enter into interlining agreements with Lufthansa and SAS; 8 °
and an obligation to allow other airlines to participate in the
frequent flyer program offered by Lufthansa and SAS.'
C. THE COMMISSION'S ASSESSMENT OF AN ALLIANCE UNDER
THE MERGER REGULATION: SWISSAIR-SABENA'
18 2
The 1995 Swissair-Sabena alliance was one of the first involv-
ing two flag carriers to be reviewed under the Merger Regula-
tion," 3 and considering that it involved third-country routes (as
Switzerland is not a member of the Community), it is particu-
larly interesting for our present purposes.
As part of their alliance, Swissair took a 49.5% stake in and
partial control of Sabena,1s4 satisfying the conditions for a con-
centration.8 5 Furthermore, both the world-wide and Commu-
nity-wide turnover sufficiently gave the alliance a Community
dimension.18 6
Upon review under the Merger Regulation, the Commission
determined that the concentration, without modifications,
would create a dominant position on some of the routes Swissair
and Sabena would operate together and therefore was likely to
significantly impede competition.18 7 However, Swissair and
Sabena offered commitments which made the alliance accepta-
ble to the Commission."" These concessions included: a restric-
tion from increasing the services on each of the routes
178 See id. art. 3.1(a), at 40.
179 See id. art. 3.8, at 41.
180 See id. art. 3.2, at 40.
181 See id. art. 3.3.
182 See Commission Decision of 20 July 1995 Declaring a Concentration to be
Compatible with the Common Market (Case No. TV/M.616-Swissair/Sabena
(II)) According to Council Regulation 4064/89, 1995 O.J. (C 200) 10 (EEC)
(LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Eclaw File).
183 See id.
184 See id. 1.
185 See id. 12.
186 See id. 15.
187 See id. 42. "[T]he Commission has come to the conclusion that the pro-
posed operation will raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common
market, because it will lead to the creation of a dominant position as a result of
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concerned beyond 25% of the present level;' 89 the relinquish-
ment of as many as twelve daily slots at Zfurich and Geneva,' 90
and as many as eighteen daily slots at Brussels; 191 an obligation
to allow other airlines to enter into interlining agreements with
Swissair and Sabena; 192 and an obligation to allow other airlines
to participate in the frequent flyer program offered by Swissair
and Sabena.' 93
The Swiss and Belgian governments also offered commit-
ments, including the transition from a single designation regime
to a multiple designation regime194 (to allow more than one car-
rier from each country to serve routes between Belgium and
Switzerland), the abolition of capacity restrictions,' 95 and the
grant of access to four other European carriers (on a "first
come, first serve" basis) to the routes concerned for fifth free-
dom operations. '96
D. CONCLUSIONS
While the proposed BA-AA alliance has been reviewed by the
Commission under Article 89, it is interesting to note that the
same types of conditions being sought in this case were required
when the Commission acted under Article 85 in its review of the
Lufthansa-SAS alliance and under the Merger Regulation in its
assessment of the Swissair-Sabena concentration. In each case,
the Commission considered that ensuring continued competi-
tion on the relevant markets (defined in terms of city-pair
routes) requires that the parties either limit or freeze capacities
on routes where they are dominant. In the case of Lufthansa-
SAS, the Commission deemed a freeze necessary, 197 while for
Swissair-Sabena, it prohibited the parties from increasing their
frequencies by more than 25%.198 For BA-AA, the Commission
1 See id. 46(iii).
1,0 See id. I 46(i).
191 See id. 46(ii).
192 See id. 46(iv).
1," See id. 46(v).
1,11 See id. 43.
195 See id.
196 See id. The fifth "freedom of the air" is the right of an air carrier to trans-
port passengers, freight, and mail between two states other than the one in which
it is licensed. ANDRFAS F. LOWENFELD &JAMES M. BURGER, AVIATION LAW § 1.12,
at 2-7 (2d ed. 1981).
197 See Commission Decision IV/35.545, art. 3.1 (a).
198 See Commission Decision of 20 July 1995 Declaring a Concentration to be
Compatible with the Common Market (Case No. IV/M.616-Swissair/Sabena
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has called for an actual reduction of frequencies on the main
routes. 9 In addition, the Commission in each case requested
that the parties relinquish take-off and landing slots to competi-
tors at airports relevant to the markets, particularly at hubs. The
Commission also required the parties to the alliances not to
have exclusive interlining agreements and frequent flyer pro-
grams but instead to allow the participation of competing air-
lines in these arrangements. Finally, the Commission.
established that it will seek commitments on the part of the
Member State(s) involved, including commitments to provide
for multiple carrier designation.
It should be noted that the Commission also recognized that
airline alliances can offer benefits to the consumer by ex-
panding and improving the quality of the services offered and
by passing the savings from the resulting synergies to the con-
sumer. However, prior to the modification of the agreements,
the Commission did not consider the benefits to outweigh the
anti-competitive effects of the alliances discussed above.
While reaffirming the Commission's past practice in reviewing
airline alliances, the Commission's notice on BA-AA at the same
time reveals some new wrinkles in the Commission's methodol-
ogy. The slot allocation formula used in BA-AA to ensure that
competitors have access to up to 55% of slots at the key airports
is interesting, as it seems to suggest a 45% market share limit for
alliances. The 55%-45% formula was also featured in the Luf-
thansa-SAS-United notice, which the Commission issued the
same day as BA-AA.2 °° It will be interesting to see whether the
Commission retains this formula for future cases.
It is also interesting that the Commission made reference in
its notice on BA-AA to a likely infringement of Article 86 "as far
as the hub-to-hub routes are concerned. 2 0 ' The Commission
made no mention of Article 86 in its 1996 notice on the BA-AA
alliance.20 2 Indeed, although the Court of First Instance has
made it clear that Articles 85 and 86 are "independent and com-
(II)) According to Council Regulation 4064/89, 1995 O.J. (C 200) 10, 46(iii)
(EEC) (LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Eclaw File).
199 See Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance Between British Airways
and American Airlines, 1998 O.J. (C 239) 10, 10-11.
200 See Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance Between Lufthansa, SAS
and United Airlines, 1998 O.J. (C 239) 5.
201 Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance between British Airways and
American Airlines, 1998 O.J. (C 239) 10.
202 See Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance Agreement Between Brit-
ish Airways and American Airlines, 1996 O.J. (C 289) 4.
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plementary provisions,' 20 3 neither the Court of Justice nor the
Court of First Instance has ever held that the mere conclusion of
an agreement between two independent companies constitutes
an abuse of a dominant position under Article 86. The Commis-
sion's claim that Article 86 applies to the BA-AA alliance in gen-
eral, as opposed to subsequent oligopolistic behavior of the
alliance, is of dubious merit. The alliance is, after all, an agree-
ment between undertakings, and does not itself entail the kind
of unilateral abuse with which Article 86 is typically concerned.
One has to wonder if the Commission's consideration of
whether a dominant position is at issue is an indication of its
belief that alliances such as BA-AA should be reviewed under
similar rules as mergers, for which the creation or strengthening
(but not abuse) of a dominant position is the relevant test. The
Commission, clearly treading on thin ice, makes no attempt to
justify its preliminary conclusion that the BA-AA agreement in-
fringes Article 86.04 While it is doubtful that the Court of Jus-
tice would uphold such a conclusion, until the Court decides on
the matter, the threat of finding an Article 86 infringement may
play a more significant role in the Commission's future reviews
of airline alliances that do not fall within the Merger Regulation.
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES IN EC COMPETITION LAW
WHICH WOULD AFFECT THE REVIEW OF
FUTURE ALLIANCES INVOLVING THIRD
COUNTRY ROUTES
The Commission has proposed an amendment to the regula-
tion implementing the competition rules in the air transport
sector that would allow the Commission unilaterally to apply the
EC competition rules to airline alliances involving third country
routes. 20 5 Concurrently, the Commission has proposed a new
regulation to enable it to grant block exemptions to air trans-
port agreements involving third country routes. 206 The Commis-
203 Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak Rausing S.A. v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. I1 - 309,
358 (Ct. First Instance 1990).
204 See Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance Between British Airways
and American Airlines, 1998 OJ. (C 239) 10.
205 See Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Regulation
3975/87 EEC Laying Down the Procedure for Application of the Rules on Com-
petition to Undertakings in the Air Transport Sector, 1997 OJ. (C 165) 13.
206 See Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements and Concerted
Practices in the Sector of Air Transport Between the Community and Third
Countries, 1997 O.J. (C 165) 14.
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sion's proposal has already been approved by the European
Parliament. 20 7 If approved by the Council, these amendments
would resolve the existing conundrum of dual competences
under Articles 88 and 89. The Commission would gain exclusive
authority to apply the EC competition rules to future alliances
involving routes outside the Community.
The first proposed change is to Regulation 3975/87, which
implements the EC competition rules in air transport. Cur-
rently, the competition rules have only been implemented in
the area of air transport between and within Member States. 20 8
The proposed amendment to Regulation 3975/87 would extend
the application of the competition rules to air transport agree-
ments involving third country routes.2 0 9 The Commission
would, as a result, be empowered to apply Article 85 directly to
airline alliances such as BA-AA, which involve third country
routes, thereby eliminating the current need for the Commis-
sion to act in coordination with the national competition au-
thorities under Article 89.
Council Regulation 3976/87 enables the Commission to grant
block exemptions in the field of intra-Community air transport,
i.e., air transport between and within Member States. 2'0 The
Commission has proposed a Regulation that would compliment
Regulation 3976/87, extending the scope of the block exemp-
tions in the sector to "international air transport between the
Community and third countries. ' 21 The proposed regulation
would allow air transport agreements involving third country
routes, which fall within the scope of the block exemptions, to
be shielded from Article 85 review.
207 See EUR. PARL. Doc. A4-0141/98 (1998) (the "Scarbonchi report").
208 See Council Regulation 3975/87, supra note 55 (implementing the competi-
tion rules to air transport between Member States); Council Regulation 2410/92,
supra note 78 (extending the implementing regulation to domestic air
transport).
209 See Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Regulation
3975/87 EEC Laying Down the Procedure for Application of the Rules on Com-
petition to Undertakings in the Air Transport Sector, 1997 (C 165) 13.
210 Council Regulation 3976/87 initially applied only to air transport between
Member States, but was amended to apply to air transport within a single Mem-
ber State. Council Regulation EEC 3976/87, supra note 34; Council Regulation
2411/92, supra note 34.
211 Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Application of Arti-
cle 85 (3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements and Concerted Prac-
tices in the Sector of Air Transport Between the Community and Third-
Countries, 1997 Oj. (C 165) 14, art. 1.
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The above-mentioned proposed changes to EC legislation ul-
timately may benefit U.S. and other non-EC airlines contemplat-
ing alliances with Community carriers. A carrier such as
American Airlines would rather have its alliance with British Air-
ways reviewed by British authorities who are sympathetic to BA's
cause,212 than by the European Commission. However, consid-
ering the rather brazen manner with which the Commission has
exerted its authority in this case, it might have been easier for
the airlines had the British authorities not been involved. In-
deed, considering that the parties already had to answer to both
the Commission and the U.S. Department of Transportation
(which has made the conclusion of a U.S.-U.K. open skies agree-
ment a condition to approving the BA-AA alliance), things
might have been easier had the parties been able to limit their
negotiations to Washington and Brussels.
Moreover, placing exclusive authority in the hands of the
Commission should bode well for the shortening of review pro-
cedures. By allowing the Commission to investigate without the
assistance of Member State authorities, reviews should move at a
quicker pace. Prompt regulatory review is essential in a rapidly
consolidating industry where two-year delays in the implementa-
tion of an alliance can place the carriers involved at a significant
disadvantage vis-A-vis their major competitors.
V. CONCLUSIONS: CLEARER SKIES AHEAD?
The Commission's reviews of the BA-AA, Lufthansa-SAS, and
Swissair-Sabena alliances provide helpful case studies for non-EC
airlines contemplating an alliance with an EC carrier because
they indicate the types of concessions that the Commission is
likely to demand in exchange for clearance. While it is now up
to the Council to decide whether the Commission's authority to
act under Article 85 extends to its consideration of alliances in-
volving third country routes, such an extension likely would im-
pact only the effectiveness with which the Commission can act
on these alliances, not the kinds of concessions the Commission
would require of them to ensure sufficient competition.
The Commission is unlikely to prohibit an alliance without
attempting to seek concessions from the partners which would,
212 The U.K. Office of Fair Trading has expressed willingness to approve the
alliance upon the relinquishment of 168 take-off and landing slots. See Robert
Rice & Emma Tucker, UK Defiant on Transatlantic Alliance, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 15,
1997, at 2.
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in its opinion, make the deal compatible with the common mar-
ket. Based on the Commission's practice to date, non-EC carri-
ers entering into alliances should expect their alliance to be
required to freeze or even reduce frequencies, relinquish take-
off and landing slots to competitors at key airports, and to per-
mit competing airlines to join their alliance's interlining and
frequent flyer program agreements. The question faced by non-
EC airlines contemplating such alliances is, therefore, how
much they are willing to sacrifice and how much time they are
willing to devote to negotiating a clearance before the deal be-
comes either impracticable or undesirable.
194 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [64
